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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
HARRY ..A.LEX...\XDER, RALPH H.
ALEX . .\XDER and E\"'"EL YN
ALEXANDER HO\VICK,
Plaintiffs and Respondfnts,

vs.
Case No.

ZION'S S. .\ VINGS BANK & TRUST
CO:J[P . \XY,
.
a corporation,

8042

Defendant,

and
HANNAH \VILSON ALEXANDER,
Defenda,nt and Appellant.

1

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEI\{ENT OF FACTS
A.

PRELIMINARY S.TATEMENT

Throughout this brief the parties will be referred
to as follo\vs: The plaintiffs and respondents, Harry
Alexander, R'alph H. Alexander and Evelyn Alexander
Hovvick will frequently be referred to as the beneficiaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

riP:-;;

tl1('

'lPf<·ndant and appellant, Hannah Wilson Alex-

a•uh•r, \\'ill lH· I'Pf(~rred to as the wife or widow. The

'

~"t tlor, IIPnr~· .:\. AlPxand<·r, will occasionally be referred

to a:-; tlt1·

hu~lJall(l.

.All itali(·:--:

an~

ours.

B. TIl J·: F .:\errs
rrllP

tltP fa<·t:--:

n·~lHHH)(-'flt~ ha\'(~
a~

no substantial dispute with

n·Jated in appellant's brief. The differences

a rising het\veen the parties concern the interpretation
of the facts as stated.
:--;T~\TE~IENT

OF POINTS

POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE WIDOW
HER ONE-THIRD STATUTORY INTEREST IN SAID
PROPERTY SINCE THE TRUST WAS VALID AND REAL
AND GAVE THE HUSBAND AN EQUITABLE LIFE ESTATE
TO WHICH THE STATUTORY INTEREST COULD NOT
ATTACH.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE WIDOW
HER ONE-THIRD STATUTORY INTEREST IN SAID
PROPERTY SINCE THE HUSBAND HAD NO GREATER
TITLE THAN AN EQUITABLE LIFE ESTATE IN THE
PROPERTY.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE WIDOW
HER STATUTORY INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY
SINCE THE HUSBAND GAINED NO INTEREST IN
ADDITION TO AN EQUITABLE LIFE ESTATE BY REASON
OF THE CONVEYANCE BY A THIRD PARTY OF THE
PROPERTY TO THE TRUSTEE.

THE ACTIONS OF THE WIDOW SHOULD PRECLUDE
HER FROM NOW ASSERTING HER STATUTORY INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY.

ARGUl\1ENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE WIDOW
HER ONE-THIRD STATUTORY INTEREST IN SAID
PROPERTY SINCE THE TRUST WAS VALID AND REAL
AND GAVE THE HUSBAND AN EQUITABLE LIFE ESTATE
TO WHICH THE STATUTORY INTEREST COULD NOT
ATTACH.

The assertion and argument of appellant that the
trust in question was illusory and that the Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Company was an ~gent rather than a
trustee is entirely without merit under the facts of this
ca~e and existing law.
The trust was originally created by a formal written
agree1nent betvveen the two "trustors" and the trustee
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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(J~~x ... 1,,).

'l'he ~·tru~tor~" reserved the use and incoine
uf t}IP }ll'OpPrty in the tru~t fund for their joint liVeS.
'l'lll· ··tru~tors" al:-;o r<~:-;erved unto thernselves jointly and
t11 thP ~urvivor thP right to revoke the trust in whole or
in '11a rt and tll<' r i .~!·ht to a1nend ' such reYocation or a111endlllPllt to bP in \rritill,~ and signed hy the "'trustors" during
tlu·ir ,joint lifetillH. or the :-:urvivor of them (Ex. "1", par.
I). 'l'ht· tru~te(~ \\'a~ .rriv<~n po\r(~rs of sale of trust propPrt~· and of <_..xeeution of n<·t(~~~ary legal documents (Ex.
""}", par. 4). 'fhe tru~tee \ras giYen the duties of paying
<'X}H:'Jl:-:t·~ of last illnes:-; and funeral charges of the
~urYiYnr and distributing the balance remaining in the
fund to th(' beneficiaries specifically named (the respondents herein) in the shares designated, and further if
either of the t\\·o grandchildren at the time of distribution be a rninor, the trustee had the further duty to.
rnanage the share of such minor during minority for
the benefit of said minor using its own discretion in fulfilling the goal~ set out (Ex. •'1", par. 3).
Respondents maintain that by the great weight of
authority in this country, such a transaction as is involYed in this case, constituted an enforceable trust and
gave the beneficiaries a vested interest subject to divestrnen t by the exercise of the power of revocation. Therefore, the trust not having been revoked, the beneficiaries
are entitled to their respective interests as provided in
the trust document. See Scott on Trusts, Vol. 1, pars.
57.1, 57.2; 73 A.L.R. 209; 43 Harv. L. Rev. 521, Trusts and
The Statut.e of Wills by Austin W. Scott.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Indeed, at 1'3 . A.L.R. p ..:!1.2. it is stated:
Hlnstead of ilnparting a testa1nentary charaeter to the instrtunent, the reservation of a right of
revocation has been held to rebut the idea that
the instrun1ent \Yas intended as a testamentary
disposition of property, since such a reservation
\vould be "~holly superfluous if the instru1nent
\vere a \vill, as a will requires no express power
to make it revocable."
Citing Hall 1·. Burklzauz) 59 Ala. 3-!9 and Cribbs v.
Walker) 85 S.W. 2-!-! .
. A.n excellent discussion of the la\v on this point is
contained in the case of Rose v. Rose (Mich. 1942), 1
N.\V-. :2d 458, where the settlor retained a beneficial life
estate plus a power of revocation plus extensive powers
of control over the trustee. The case held that title to
the trust property passes to the trustee by virtue of the
trust in~trument and that the beneficiaries take vested
intere~ts in the property, the powers reserved to the
trustor a1nounting to conditions subsequent, upon the
happening of which the vested interests are divested.
Also, see Kelly v. Pa.rker) 54 N.E. 615; Goodrich et al v.
City J~.Tational Bank & Trust Company of Battle Creek)
258 N.\V. 253; and K eck v. McKinstry e.t al.J 221 N.W.
851.
The case of Kelly v. Pa,rker placed significance in
the fact that the subject matter of the trust was land and
that it \vas conveyed by a formal instrument in which the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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}llll'})U~P~

or

tllP t ru~t \Vere fully stated. Along this line

ul' thinki11g' the Uf'slntr'Jnent of the Law of Trusts, Sec.
~,7, par. g:, p. 17~', ~tates:
''In clt•t(·rtnining \\'hether the reserved po\vers
a J'( • ~o grc·~t t a:-: to n1ake the trustee an agent of
tht• :-:<~ttlor, ()lle of t}l(~ factors to he considered is
tlu~

fonualit~· of tlH~ tran:-:aetion.
tran:--:r .. r to t}H~ trust(--e \\'as by a

Thus, if the
deed for1nally
~'XeeutPd a11d r(·(·on](~d, the eonclusion that the
tru~t<·P \ra~ al~o the agent of the settlor would be
I··~~ likely to he dra,vn than if the transfer were
le~~ for1nall~· eYidenced."

''"'hen all i~ ~aid and done, the determination of the
<·a~es on this ~u bjeet boils do\vn to an interpretation by
the court of the intent of the settlor. It is stated in the
case of Talbot et al r. Talbot et al., 78 A. 535, that in
deter1nining \vhether or not there w·as an intent to create
a trust, the facts should be construed as strongly as
possible in favor of a trust. In a case with more powers
reserved to the settlor than in the case at bar, Nichols v.
Enzery et al., (Calif.), -!1 Pac. 1089, the court, speaking
about the reservation of the right of revocation, stated:

"Indeed, this power of reservation was
strongly favored in the case of voluntary settlen1ents at common law, and such a trust, without
such a reservation was open to suspicion of undue
advantage taken of the settlor."
Citing Lew,in, Trusts, pp. 75, 76, and Perry, Trusts, par.
104.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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doubt

\Yhnt~oevPr

in the present case, but that the intent of the

~Pttlor \\'as

It is \Yondered if therP can he

an~·

to create a legal and binding trust.
fir~t

property, obYiously for their o\rn present benefit

and for the ulti1nate benefit of their
fir~t

and his

'vife created the trust, of their ho1ne and certain

per~onal

the

~rhe ~ettlor

~ettlor

O\rn

heirs. Ho"v can

be said to have given up nothing when his

'vife, E1nily, 'vas giYen a life interest along with

hin1 a~ a joint beneficiary f Ho'\Y can it be said that the
bank \\~as the n1ere agent of Henry A. Alexander when
the property \Vas for1nally conveyed to the said bank
and w·hen said bank 'vas given duties to perform in relation to the property so given J?
ould not the overthrowing
of thi~ trust agreement as testamentary be the grossest
kind of derogation of the intent of Henry A. Alexander
that the heirs of himself and his first wife, En1ily J.
Alexander, should ultimately have the full ownership of
the property that he and Emily had accumulated during
their 1narriage? Is it so strange that a man and wife
should desire their own children and grandchildren to
succeed to the property they accumulate during their
1narriage~ And what of the distribution provided in the
tru~t instrument leaving shares of the remainder to
specifically named persons~ Is the court to ignore this
provi~ion and hold that these beneficiaries so named have
no interest at all under the trust agreement~ Respondent:' re~pectfully sub1nit that the overwhelming weight of
authority gives these beneficiaries an in11nediate vested

''r

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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intPrP~t in the trust property, subject only to being

div<ll"ted by exE~n·ise of the powers of revocation or
RlllPJHltnen t.
In tl1P

aJrH~ndtnent

'"hi('h \Vas Pxecuted hy Henry A .
.\lPxan(h•r (J~:x. --~'') a further reaffirmation of Henry
.. \. :\lPX(lltdPr'~ intPnt is sho,vn '''hen he provided for the
ri,!.d1t of personal use and ol·(·upane~· of the home by his
:'P<·ond "·if .. , oPfendant herein, and in the last sentence
:'ta ted:
"Further I herel)y declare said original trust
agree1nent as herehy amended to be in full force
and effect."

1t appears that the possibility of a second wife's
:'tatutory dower interest interfering with the rights of
the heirs of Henry ...l . ..._llexander and Emily J. Alexander
could indeed haYe even been a reason for establishing
such a trust fund.
The cases cited by appellant in her brief are in the
1nain not in point and the ones which may be in point
represent a minority point of view.
The case of Warsco v. Oshkosh Savings & Trust
Co., 196 N.W. 829, which relies on McEvoy v. Bo-ston
Five Cents Savings Bank, 87 N.E. 465, represents a weak
stand in the law of trusts. The W arsco case itself could
not be used as authority in Wisconsin today inasmuch
as a later statute has changed the law in Wisconsin so as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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to conforn1 \Yith th~ 1najorit:· _point of YiP\\~
1933, par. ~~il.~05).

(

1Vis. 6Ytnt.

The J/ cEvoy ea~e '"a~ subsequently "·eakened in
~Iassachu~ett~ by the case of J one<~· c. Old Colony Trust
Co._, 146 X.E. 716, a. case "·ith yery si1nilar facts which
held that there \Yas a. Yalid trust. For a discussion of
the~e cases, see 43 Hart~. L. Ret:., p. 531 and following;
and Scott on Trusts, \'"ol. 1, par. 57.2.
The X e\v York cases cited by appellant involve situations \vhere husbands are attempting to defeat rights
given wives under a N e\v York statute and are therefore
not in point. The same comment applies to the Ohio
cases.
Other cases upholding respondents' view of the law
on this subject are as follows:
T. . an Cott v. Prent,ice and others, 10 N.E. 257;

Kelley v. Sno1r et al., 70 N.E. 89;
Roche v. Brickley, 150 N.E. 866;
Lines v. Lines et al., 21 A. 809;
Windolph v. Girard Trust Co., et al., 91 A. 634;
Beirne v. Continental Equ,itable T1·ust Co., 161 A.

721·

'

Louise Berg;uann v. Forem.an State Trust and
Savings Bank et al., 273 Ill. App. 408.
Also,

~ee

Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, , . . ol. 1, par. 104.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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l:>OINrr II.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE WIDOW
Hl·:lt ONE-THIRD STATUTORY INTEREST IN SAID
PROPERTY SINCE THE HUSBAND HAD NO GREATER
TITLE THAN AN EQUITABLE LIFE ESTATE IN THE
PROPERTY.

In app(dlant's Point II thP argument if3 rnade that

llt·Jtry . \ . .~\l•~xaud<~r O\\'lled full and con1plete equitable
tith~ to tht· pr()pPrty in quP;;;fioH to which the statutory
int(•f't>~t attaclted.
'T'1H~

l'l-':-'}HHtdent:' haYe n() disagreeinent \vith the cases
cited h~T ap1Jellant "Thith hold that dower will attach to
an (•qnitable fee sin1ple estate. [;Ttah Code Annotated,
l.fJ.j.'J, See. 7-1--1-3 u1akes it clear that the widow's interest
1,rovided therein "Till attach to an equitable fee simple
e~tate in real property possessed by the husband at any
ti1ne during the n1arriage. However, it is also clear,
under the facts in this case and under existing law, that
the settlor retained only an equitable life estate and not
an equitable fee si111ple estate, and therefore, the \vido'v
does not qualify under Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Sec.
7-1:-4-3.
_A_ny such reasoning as suggested by appellant would
state that the beneficiaries specifically named in the
trust agreement had nothing but a mere expectancy. It
is difficult to see h·ow the terms of a formal agreement
could be so utterly disregarded as to hold that the beneficiaries had no more than they would have had, had
there been no trust agreement at all.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It is stated in Tiffany Rea.l Propert!J, rPhird :BJd. \r ol.
1, at page 81:
·•\\~hile

the gift of a power of disposition to
one to \Yhonl the property has been devised \Yithout "\Vords of lin1ita tion has been regarded as suf.
ficient to sho\Y an intention to give hi1n an estate
in fee simple, no such effect properly follows fro1n
the gift of a power to one to who1n a life~ estate
has been explicitly given. In other "\Vords, the gift
of a power of disposition does not enlarge an
estate for life to an estate in fee simple, especially
\vhere the power is limited to disposition in the
lifetin1e of the devisee, * * * * Somewhat singularly, in a few states, a contrary view has been
asserted, provided the power is general in character."
. A. thorough study of the law on this point is contained in 36 A.L.R. 1218. In that annotation, the minority
cases cited were all from West Virginia., Virginia.,
Tennessee, and Michigan. The rule has later been
changed by statute in the states of West Virginia, Virginia, and Tennessee, to conform with the majority point
of view. See Tiffan;y Real Property, Third Edition, Vol.
1, Footnote 79, p. 83.
It appears to respondents that the cases cited by
appellant represent an exceedingly small minority view
and possibly a confusion by courts of cases of dissimilar
fact situations with the rule of Shelley's case. It seems
inconceivable that such reasoning could defeat the rights
of specifically named beneficiaries as exist in the trust
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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a~roPtnent

involved in this caHe. Such reasoning could
hP u:--:('d to defeat the obviou~ intent of the settlor as it is
in this ease, wh<·n~ beneficiaries were specifically named
to n·<·Pi ve Hueh of the estate as remained in the trust
l'und at ~Pttlor~s d<'ath. The two gifts certainly are not
i11<·on~i~t('nt "'ith ea<·h other inas1nuch as the beneficiaries
intPrP~t~ only <~xi:-:ted in such property as had not been
takPn out of the trust at the tiiue of the settlor's death.
Ut·spond~Ht:-;

reassert that they had a vested interest
in the trust fro111 the ti1ne of the c·reation of the trust,
subjt·et only to be defeated by a condition subsequent,
revo<-·ation or a1nendn1ent by both of the joint "trustors"
or the surviYor. F,urthertnore, appellant's argument could
only c-onceivably apply to a settlor who had reserved to
hitnself a life estate. That is not the fact in this case
ina~n1ueh as the estate reserved was for the joint lives
of Henry· .A.. Alexander and his first wife, Emily J.
Alexander.
11 he appellant n1akes an argument indicating that

the "Tife's statutory interest should attach due to the fact
that the husband, at his death, had the power of disposition over the propert~T· Such reasoning would lead to
a rule of law that dower attaches to a mere right of
revocation. This is certainly a far cry from a freehold
estate \vhich children of the marriage would inherit.
See 17 Am. Jur. p. 687. It is needless to say that the
respondents have been unable to find any cases which go
as far as to allow dower to attach to such an interest.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE WIDOW
HER STATUTORY INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY
SINCE THE HUSBAND GAINED NO INTEREST IN
ADDITION TO AN EQUITABLE LIFE ESTATE BY REASON
OF THE CONVEYANCE BY A THIRD PARTY OF THE
PROPERTY TO THE TRUSTEE.

l,..nder Point III of appellant's brief, it is argued
that the "?ife's statutory interest attached to the property in question by reason of the transaction whereby
the original real property in the trust fund was conveyed
to a third party by the trustee in exchange for the
present property in the fund conveyed on the same date
by the third party to the trustee. The form executed by
Henry . .~. Alexander with respect to the new property
(Ex. 3) stated that said property coming to the trustee
was to be held subject to the original trust agree1nent,
"as if the same for all intents and purposes had been
deposited with you at the time of making said agreement." The evidence is uncontroverted that the legal
title to the present trust property passed directly by
warranty deed from Louis D·eYoung and Louise S. Deyoung, grantors, to Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Company, grantee (Ex. 5). The obvious purpose of the instrument executed by Henry A. Alexander with respect
to this property (Ex. 3) was to inform the trustee that
this property was to be held subject to the original trust
as if originally deposited in said trust.
It js difficult to ascertain the ground on which appellant relies in asserting that Henry A. Alexander at any
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t i tne had l'ull legal and equitable title to this property.
rl'ltt· only <·vidt·rwP subtnitted on the subject is the Warrant~· l><·<><l fro1u tlu~ DeYoungs to the Zion's Savings
I~ank ~ 'l'ru~t Cotupany.
'l'h(' n<·xt ground urg(~d by appellant is that the
hu~hand, at oJH· ti111e

had full equitable title to this propPrty l·~· rPa~o11 of the aforernentioned transaction. The
only P\'idt·n(·t· on the Hubject indicates a straight trade
lwt\\"t><·n tltt· DeYoungs and the Bank (Exs. 3 and 4).
'l'here i~ no \rritten <'Ontract alleged or proved py appellant. }{.p~pondents agree "~ith appellant on what the law
i~ in t~tah a~ laid do\\·n by the case of ll1cNeil v. McNeil,
Gl litah 141, :211 Pac. 988 (1922). Respondents agree
that in such a situation the husband must be in a position
to co1npel eonyeyance to hin1self under the contract befor(:_• the "~ife'~ statutor~~ interest will attach. This is a
situation "·here equity has looked at that being done
\Yhieh should be done under the contract. However,
there is no contract to enforce in the present case. Even
if there "·ere such a contract, to whom could the husband
have co1npelled conveyance·~ Not to himself, but to another. It is generally stated that the estate to which
do,ver attaches Inust be an inheritable estate, so that the
children, if any, of the marriage would inherit it. 17
Anz. Jur. 687. It seems inconceivable that there ever
\Yas an interest present \Vhich could have been inherited
by children of the second marriage. It is respectfully
sub1nitted that Henry A. Alexander never, at any time,
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had any intere8t in the trust property in question other
than his interest8 by virtue of the trust agree1nent .
.J..\ccording to the rea8oning offered by appellant,
the \Yife, 8i1nply by the trade heretofore mentioned,
\vould have a statutory do,ver interest not only in the
property presently in the trust, but also in the property
no\Y held by the DeY oungs. This certainly would appear
to be an a1nazing result in vie'v of the fact that she never
did have an interest in the original trust property which
had been placed in the trust years before her n1arriage
to Henry .J..\. Alexander by Henry A. Alexander and his
first wife, E1nily J. Alexander.
The rule as established by the MeN eil case is a rule
determining interests under an executory contract for
the sale of land. It is difficult to understand how this
case and like cases could apply to the facts of the case at
bar. In the case at bar, it appears that there vva.s an
instantaneous exchange of properties. An executory
contract does not appear to have existed at any time.
Although it is not argued in appellant's brief, it
appears to respondents that the court may consider
whether or not a resulting trust could be present. It
immediately occurs to respondents that such a concept
would be highly incongruous in the facts of the present
case, as it would present the question of having a resulting trust inconsistent with and opposed to a prior express
trust.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
rrhe c·a:..;e of Ml~lenky ,,;. Melen et al., 134 N.E. 822,
opinion by J uHtice Cardozo, presents a somewhat analog-ou:..; :..;ituation. In that <'a:..;e a widower conveyed a parcel

of" land to hi:..; :..;on eoupled with an oral prornise to recon\'<•y on detuancl. Later, the \vidower remarried. Subsequently, on dt~utand, the son refused to reconvey to the
rather hut did ('ODV(ly a life estate which the father
a('<·<·pt<~cl. It \ra~ held in that ~a~e that the father could
enfon·t· a <·onveyan<·t· if there was an abuse of confidence,
but that this ri~bt ,,·a~ a chose in action and not seisin
to ''" hic:h do\vt) r could attach.
J n t1H· case at bar it is difficult to see any possibility
of :--:eisin in the husband, but only rights to obtain property, \\·hich he did not choose to exercise.
In the case of Phelp~ c. Phelps et al., 38 N.E. 280,
tht> husband paid for certain lands and had them conveyed to a third party under an agreement that the
h u~ band receive all of the benefits and have full control
over ~aid lands. The court held that there was no dower
in ~aid lands, stating:
~·To

entitle the \vife to dower, the husband
1nust be seised either in fact or in law, of a present freehold in the premises, as well as of an
estate of inheritance."
The court held that the husband had no such estate.
Also, the case of Nash v. Kirshoff, 208 N.W. 193, held
that the purchase of property by a husband and his

'
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taking the conveyanre in the na1ne of another does not
g·iye the "~ife 1na.rital rights therein, citing .L1mm.u.ndson
r. Hauson, 1S5
252.

X.,,:.

Cases holding contrary to the above-1nentioned cases
are eases 'vhere it has appeared that there has been
fraud on the rights of the \Yife. There is positivel~~ no
"~hisper of fraud in the case at bar. In the case at bar,
the \Yife is asserting a statutory interest in property
conveyed in trust by Henry A. Alexander and his first
'vife. The property in the trust fund, at no time reverted
to Henry .A. Alexander, and the second wife could not
possibly haYe been. defrauded as to property traded in
exchange for property in which she, at no time had any
interest. On the contrary, it appears that Henry A.
Alexander \Yas very much concerned about protecting
the \velfare of his second wife, should she survive him,
by amending the trust so as to allow her to live in the
hon1e as long as she should desire (Ex. 2).
Because of the above reasoning and law, the respondents 1naintain that it is inconceivable that the second
wife, Hannah Wilson Alexander, could have gained a
statutory do\ver interest in the present trust property
because of the exchange of the property originally in the
trust for the property presently in the trust.
POINT IV.
THE ACTIONS OF THE WIDOW SHOULD PRECLUDE
HER FROM NOW ASSERTING HER STATUTORY INTEREST Sponsored
IN THE
PROPERTY.
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'l'l1(' J'('~pono(•nt~ further contend that Hannah Wil~on ~\ lt-xarHh·r, h(·eau~e

of her conduct, should now be
··~topped l'rotn a~~erting her ~tatutory interest in the
l•~""IH'rty iu qu(·~tion. The trust in question was establi~h•·d by I-lc·nry .A .. \h·xander and his first wife, Emily
.J. . \lt·\arJdt-r, 011 ,January 10, 1930, said trust providing
that the· ultitJI:tt(• b(•JH·fi(·iari(~~ be the son and t\VO grand('hildrt>ll of said llenry ~\. and Emily J. Alexander. At
a :-:ub~Pquent ti111t-, J~~utily .J. Alexander died. Subsequent
to thi~, on N o\TeHtber :~, 1936, Henry A. Alexander mar~
ri(·d tlu_} present Hannah \Vilson Alexander, a sister of
l~Inily J ..Alt·xander (R. ;)1). Hannah Wilson Alexander
rau1e into thi~ 1uarriage \\Tith her own separate property,
a ho1ne located at -!57 La1nbourne Avenue, Salt Lake
ity, l"""tah (R. 51). On July 11, 1940, Henry A. Alexander executed an amendment to the Trust Agreement
giving Hannah ''1 ilson Alexander, should she survive.
hi1n, the right to live in the ho1ne held in the trust fund,
as long as she should desire, said right not to extend
to a life estate but confined to personal use and occupancy.
1

(

On September 9, 1941, Hannah Wilson Alexander
conveyed her home at 457 Lambourne Avenue to her
son, Henry 'Vilson, and his wife, Gertrude Wilson, as
joint tenants and to the survivor (R. 51).
Henry A. Alexander died in June of 1943 (R. 46).
After his death, Hannah Wilson Alexander continued
to live in the home which is the subject matter of the
trust, until May of 1952 (R. 46) or approximately nine
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Year~. In :Jlay of 1~)3~ Hannah \,ViJson --:\lexander 1noved

out of this ho1ne and the beneficiaries 1nade a dPlnand
on the trustee to distribute the trust fund (R·. -l-0). It
appears fron1 these facts that Henry .1\. _AJexander intended to fully provide for the \Yelfare of his second
'vife, Hannah, consi~tent "Tith the terins of the trust and
ultimate gift to his son and grandchildren by his first
1narriage. Consistent to this sche1ne of things, Hannah
\\~ilson ~-\lexander subsequently conveyed her separate
property, the home at 457 Lan1bourne A venue, to her
son by a prior marriage. After the death of Henry A .
..L-\lexander, Hannah Wilson Alexander accepted the benefits provided by the amendment to the trust and lived
in the home in the trust fund for approximately nine
years. Now, at this time, she asserts that the trust was
invalid and never existed. If this be the fact, she has deprived the son and grandchildren of Henry A. Alexander
from property they would have inherited, for a period of
approximately nine years. The respondents assert that
this inconsistent conduct on the part of appellant has
worked greatly to their disadvantage and therefore
she should be estopped from now asserting her statutory dower interest. It is believed that an analogy
can be made to the following statement at 17 Am. Jur.
735:
"Another class of estoppel arises where a
woman accepts a provision under a will and, in the
sa1ne will, a gift is made to others which is manifestly intended to carry a title free of encumbrance. In this case, on the principle that one
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cannot clahn under and at the same time against
a will and by analog-y to the case of a devise by
the husband in lieu of dower she is estopped to
(·laitll dower in derogation of the other gift."

l Ttalt (·as(·, Ln re Kjar's Estate, 220 Pac. 501,
ti~ l"talt 4~7, it was held that a husband's conveyance of
all hi~ prOJH'rty in anti<·i pation of death to his wife and
othPr lllPtnhers of his fatnily, in the absence of evidence
to the ('Ontrary, \rill he· pr(~~u1ued to have been made with
her (•on~('nt and ,,·ill operate a~ a relinquish1nent of her
onP-thi nl l"tatutory interest.
In a

It is subtnitted that the an1endment to the trust operating to give Hannah ''Tilson Alexander a home to live
in for the rest of her life if she desired, her subsequent
conve~·ance of her own ho1ne to her son by a prior marriage, her subsequent acceptance of the use of the home
for nine years and now her assertion that there was no
tru~t, all fit together to show a scheme of things whereby
a 'Yife has relinquished any statutory right she would
have in the home.
The age and physical condition of Hannah Wilson
Alexander (R. 27, R. 46) when viewed in the light of the
facts stated, tend strongly to an inference that her claim
'vas not really urged by herself but by her son who will
inherit whatever property she receives.
Because of the above facts it is believed that appellant should be estopped from now asserting a statutory
one-third interest in the property in question.
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CONCJ~USION

On the basis of the faets and the elear la \V on the
~ubject, looking at the case as a 'vhole, it is clear that
there is nothing Inore than an intervivos trust 'vhich
Yes ted estates in the beneficiaries prior to the marriage
of the settlor and the appellant. After this 1na.rriage,
there "~as a sin1ple exchange of one property for another
"Tith titles passing direct ...A. s a result of the above transactions, the statutory one-third interest never attached
to the property and the beneficiaries are now entitled to
their shares as provided in the trust agreement.
Therefore, the Decree of the trial court wa.s correct
and should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN L. BLACK,
Counsel for Pla,intiffs and
R.espondents.
530 Judge Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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